Usual microeconometric studies of the French fertility su¤er from the lack of data on religion. Indeed, the French laws make it very di¢ cult to collect data on the individual's religious a¢ liation. However, recent studies tend to validate the important role played by culture and especially religion in fertility behaviors. This paper proposes a microeconometric investigation of the French fertility where religion is taken into account. As a result, to be Catholic has no signi…cant e¤ect on fertility and considering oneself as a believer does also not matter. However, to be a practicer, whatever the measure that is chosen, has always a positive and signi…cant impact on expected fertility. This paper also validates usual predictions of family economics. The income of male has a positive impact on the female fertility while the female income has a negative impact on women's fertility. Moreover, the school attainment of women has a negative impact on their expected number of children. Finally, in line with recent studies of Adserá [2006] ; Fernandez & Fogli [2007], Brae nas-Garza & Neuman [2006], etc., the present paper reconciles the beckerian analysis of fertility behaviors and the idea that non economical factors, namely culture, are hugely important in fertility choices. JEL Codes: J11, J13, Z12
Introduction
Usual microeconometric studies of the French fertility su¤er from a lack of data on religion.
The aim of this chapter is to overcome this shortcoming by providing a microeconometric investigation of the French fertility where, for the …rst time to the best of my knowledge, religion is taken into account. Furthermore, beyond this religious dimension, I provide complementary proxies for culture like the transmission of family values from parents to children.
As mentioned in the general introduction, the economic analysis of fertility behaviors enriched with microeconomic foundations since the seminal approach of Becker et al [1960, 1973, 1976] . The Beckerian theory assumes that children are time consuming, especially for women. It implies that higher female income results in smaller fertility rates 2 . The household theory of fertility 3 shows that an increase in the income of women reduces their fertility while an increase in the male income increases the household total fertility rate (TFR). Indeed, a higher male income reduces the opportunity cost for the woman not to participate to the workforce 4 . These standard mechanisms of endogenous fertility models have largely been evidenced by empirical studies without including cultural variables 5 . This absence of cultural determinants was essentially due to the lack of datasets allowing to clearly identify and measure cultural variables.
Thanks to the recent development of rich datasets including both economic and cultural variables, economists are now able to properly measure the impact of culture on fertility 6 . Doing so, they can test the validity of the usual Beckerian conclusions in a framework where culture matters. In the present chapter, I provide a contribution to this recent literature. Religion is often chosen by the literature to identify and measure culture 7 . Guiso et 2 Becker & Tomes [1976] argue that an increase in the parental income incite parents to have less children better educated because the income elasticity of demand for quality is higher than the income elasticity of demand for quantity. 3 See, for instance, Browning et al [2006] for a review of this literature. 4 See, for instance, Galor & Weil [1996] and Browning et al [2006] . 5 See Schultz [2008] and Hotz et al [1993] for a review of this literature. 6 See Guiso et al [2006] for a review of this literature. 7 Fernandez and Fogli [2007] show, without using religious variables, that culture is important to the 2 al [2006] argue that "religious practices, even when they respond to economic conditions, are modi…ed over time only at centuries or even millennium frequency. In this spirit, we restrict our attention (...) to those cultural aspects like religion and ethnic background that can largely be treated as invariant over an individual's lifetime" 8 . Religiosity, however, appears to be a signi…cant determinant of fertility. Neuman & Ziderman [1986] …nd that, among Jews, religiousness (measured by time devoted to religious activities) strongly and signi…cantly increases fertility. Heineck [2006] studies the link between religion and fertility in Austria. He …nds that women who are "strong Catholic believers" are expected to have larger families than woman without any religious belief.
Hacker [1999] shows that the degree of Christian conservatism is a good proxy for religious sentiment for American-born white women in the nineteenth century. Conservatism is measured by a dummy variable indicating whether individuals belong to speci…c religious groups such as Congregationalists, Universalists, Lutherans or Catholics. He …nds that this proxy has a signi…cant e¤ect on women's fertility: more conservatism implies a higher total understanding of female work and fertility decisions. They observe the economic behavior of immigrants in the United States during the second half of the twentieth century. They consider the expected female labor force participation and their total fertility rate, for the year 1950 in the immigrant's country of origin, as a good proxy for culture. It re ‡ects their country's cultural attitude toward women's labor and fertility. They …nd that the cultural proxy is an economically and statistically signi…cant variable to explain women's labor force participation and their total fertility rate. This epidemiological method could not be applied in the French case because informations about ethnic origin or country of origin cannot be collected. 8 Birdsall [1988] argues, following Easterlin [1978] and Easterlin et al [1980] , that fertility behaviors are in ‡uenced by social norms. She mentions that "these norms may change in response to economic factors, but they are viewed as changing slowly enough so that for individual couples within a given society they can be considered as exogenous to fertility" fertility rate. Williams and Zimmer [1990] , Adserá [2006] ; Amin et al [1997] show that the religiousness measured by church attendance has a positive and signi…cant impact on fertility 9 .
France is a secularized country with a Catholic identity. It was the …rst European country to enter the secularization process. Furthermore, the proportion of Catholics practicers keeps dramatically decreasing since 1945. This process quickened during the seventies. In 2001, the proportion of French individuals who had at least one element of Catholic practice 10 per month is about 12% (Hervieu-Léger [2004] ). This makes intuitive that religiousness should have a relevant impact on individual fertility (see Adsera [2006] ).
The data set "Enquête Mode de Vie des Français" is the …rst opportunity to measure the impact of religion and religiousness on fertility in France. It provides precise measures for religion like to be a Believer or not, church attendance, individual's estimation of the importance of religion in their own life 11 . This data is also rich of numerous informations about the respondent's economic situation (incomes, savings, wealth, history on the labor market, etc.), his lifestyle (health, addictions, consuming habits, etc.), his risk aversion and his values (religion, politics, attitude toward foreigners, etc.)
Several dimensions of religion are investigated in the present chapter. As in the usual literature, I explore the impact of the adherence to a religion, of believing (to be a religious believer or not) and of religiousness on fertility. I …nd that having been raised in a speci…c religion has no e¤ect on expected fertility. De…ning oneself as a religious believer has, a priori, a positive and signi…cant impact on individual fertility. Nevertheless this e¤ect loses its signi…cance when the degree of religiousness is introduced. This latter is …nally the only religious variable that really matters for fertility. This result is validated whether religiousness is measured by church attendance or by the respondent's subjective evaluation 9 Note that Brae nas-Garza & Neuman [2006] …nd that, among Spanish catholics, the exposure to religious practice during childhood has a positive impact on fertility. They also …nd that current religiosity of the respondent has no e¤ect on fertility. However, the exposure to religious practice during childhood and current religiosity are strongly correlated. 10 Either going to church, going to cathechism, confession, etc. 11 Notice that, as the main purpose of this data set was not the study of fertility behaviors, some relevant informations are missing. Particularly, the absence of information on children's education makes it impossible to investigate the quality quantity trade-o¤ chosen by parents. Furthermore, children's date of birth are not reported. It prevents the study of the impact of family policies on fertility choices and the examination of births spacing behaviors. of the importance of religion in his own life. This last measure is innovative in the literature.
Culture is not investigated only through the impact of religion on fertility. Indeed, I explore two aspects of the cultural transmission into the family: the in ‡uence of parental fertility on the own respondent's fertility and the transmission of "Family Ties / Family Oriented Values" 12 among generations. I …nd that these two channels are as important as religious variables to explain fertility. Indeed, having been raised in a large family signi…cantly increases the repondent's expected fertility. The interpretation of this result is not straightforward. Bisin & Verdier [2001] underline the possibility that parents transmit their preferences to their children through a socialization process. Then, the e¤ect of the variable "parental fertility" could re ‡ect some transmission of the parental taste for fertility but also alternative transmissions from parents to children like social position and location.
Nevertheless, this variable allows to control my results for these e¤ects.
I also …nd that respondent's who have been raised in a family with "strong family ties" have signi…cantly more children than others. Family ties are measured by replies to the following questions: "Which of the following values do you (or would you) try to transmit to your children?" and "Among the same set of values, which ones did your parents transmit you?" Respondent have been allowed to choose three answers among twelve like "Independency", "Taste for Work", "Generosity", Happiness", Honesty", "Family Values", etc. A respondent who choose "Family Values" for one of the questions gets one, he gets two if he chooses it for the two questions and zero otherwise 13 . I …nd that this score variable, called "Family Oriented values", has a positive and signi…cant impact on the respondent's fertility. I control my results for the respondent's familial background. Obviously, never having been married strongly decreases expected fertility. Among the conclusions of usual family economics (see Behrman [1993] ), I …nd that male income has a positive impact on female fertility whereas the female income has a negative impact. The women's education negatively 12 From French "Le sens de la Famille". I will refer to Family Oriented Values during the rest of the chapter. 13 Alesina & Giuliano [2007] …nd that strong family ties are associated with higher fertility with a di¤erent method. They measure family ties with individual responses from the World Value Survey "regarding the role of the family and the love and respect that children need to have for their parents" for over 70 countries. They show that strong family ties implies a relatively stronger reliance to home production than to labor market participation. It results in lower labor force participation of women and higher fertility.
in ‡uences fertility 14 in the sense that the least educated women have more children than others. The respondent's age is the most powerful explanatory variable for the high frequency of observations where fertility equals zero. It highlights the strong postponement of …rst births which is a common characteristic of all developed countries. Furthermore, the woman's education and the size of the city where she lives both have a signi…cant impact on the decision not to have children: highly educated women from big cities are more likely to choose not having children than other women.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the French fertility. Section 3 describes the data set "Enquête Mode de Vie des Français". Section 4 discusses the estimation method and presents its main results. Section 5 proposes some robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
A Brief Overview of The French Fertility
The French fertility has been the …rst to decrease in early Europe in the eighteenth century.
It started to decrease even before mortality. This feature has often been mentioned to invalidate the traditional theory of the demographic transition which presents the decrease of mortality as the main reason for the long run fall in fertility (Galor [2005a] ). France has also been the …rst European country to enter secularization. This has favored the adoption of modern methods of birth control and notably contraception (Lesthaeghe & Wilson [1986] and Kirk [1996] ). Lesthaeghe [1977] underlines that the proximity of the French culture was one of the main determinant of the earlier and faster fertility decrease in Wallonia than in
Flanders.
As in all European countries, after the Second World War, fertility in France has been relatively high until the seventies. In 1970, the total fertility rate was very close to 2,5 children per women. Since 1964, the French fertility had decreased and reached its lowest level, in a period of peace 15 , at 1,66 children per women in 1993. As displayed on …gure 1, since 1994, this rate has always been increasing to reach 1,98 in 2006.
In 1994, the French family policies became more generous. Subsidies for births particu- Toulemon et al [2008] argue that the family policies in France have created especially positive attitudes towards two or three child families. Such policies have largely enjoyed a consensus among politicians and French residents. Laroque & Salanie [2005] also …nd that 16 Indeed, in France like in other European countries, the relationship between fertility and women's participation to the labor market is now positive (see Ahn & Mira [2002] ). 17 Prioux [2007] provides an enlighting presentation of fertility evolutions in France for the last thirty years. 7 …nancial incentives have been e¢ cient in increasing the fertility in France.
If the current French fertility rate is below its replacement level, it is the highest among European countries since 2002 (see …gure 2). France is expected to increase its population up to 65,7 million people in 2050 while the German's population is expected to decrease in the same time. If this happens, Germany's population would stay the largest in Europe and the French population the second largest one. Due to larger fertility, ageing is expected to be lower in France, it implies that the proportion of the French population in Europe is expected to raise from 16 to 17% 18 . The main reason lies in the fact that men and women do not experience the same pattern 18 8 of fertility throughout their life. Women can only procreate during a limited period of time while men are not biologically limited. Furthermore, the measurement of women's fertility is less sensible to measurement errors. After having deleted missing observations, the sub sample is reduced to 1799 observations. Notice that, for robustness checks, the data set will be extended to men.
The sub sample's total fertility rate equals 1,6 children. Among the 1793 women, 466 do not have children while only 121 have more than three children. The average age is about 48. 219 women are less than 28 years old and 952 are more than 45 years old. 1500 have been raised in a Catholic family while only 988 consider themselves as believers and 540 are considered as practicers 19 . Finally, 849 women from the selected sample are currently married.
To measure the impact of religion, it is important to discriminate between the adherence to a speci…c religion and the religiousness. In the present study, the religious a¢ liation of agents is divided between major religions (Catholics, Muslims, Protestants, Jews...). It refers to their response to the question: "In which religion have you been raised?". Their actual faith is measured by their response to the question: "Are you a believer?".
As in Williams and Zimmer [1990] , Adserá [2006] ; Amin et Al [1997] , the degree of religiousness is …rst measured by attendance to religious o¢ ce. The variable "O¢ ce Frequency" goes from zero to …ve. It equals to one if he announces never going to religious o¢ ce and …ve if he goes to o¢ ce at least once a week. It increases with the respondent's frequency of attendance to o¢ ces. For robustness checks, another measure of religiousness is provided:
people were asked to evaluate the importance of religion in their own life from zero to ten.
The sample is not reduced to women who have completed their fertility as, for instance, in Fernandez & Fogli [2007] and Breierova & Du ‡o [2004] . This allows the sample size to be larger and to extend the study to a higher number of generations. If religion has not the same impact on all the generations of women, restraining the analysis to older woman could lead to biased estimations. One could oppose that current and achieved fertility do not describe the same phenomenon. However, during robustness checks, the sub sample of women who have achieved their fertility is studied.
As not all women in the sample have completed their fertility, it is obvious that the age of the respondent has a strong in ‡uence on her fertility. The older a woman, the higher her fertility. This partly comes from the postponement of the …rst birth. Furthermore, women older than 45 are expected to have completed their reproduction process.
Directly introducing the age of the respondent sensibly increases the overall …t of the model. The e¤ect of age re ‡ects, however, much more complex phenomena than the simple position of the respondent in her "reproductive process" 20 . Indeed, age also re ‡ects impor- Only the position in the reproductive process is used in the regressions. This is called the "dummies strategy" where I control my results for less than 28 and more than 45 years old. This makes the interpretation of the e¤ect of age easier. Notice that these dummies also capture cohort e¤ects but these latter will be easier to identify. The results are also provided when the age is directly introduced in the regressions (See Table 7 ). The impact of proxies for cultural transmission inside the family and for religiosity are always validated.
Women from the entire sample are not necessarily married because, once again, reducing the analysis to married women would induce the presence of a selection bias 21 . Indeed, doing so, I would measure the impact of religion and cultural transmission among married French women and not among French women. It can reasonably be expected that married woman are not characterized by the same sensitivity toward religion and familial values than non married women. I obviously control my results for the respondent's situation on the marriage market.
Family economics argue that female's education and incomes play a major role in the determination of optimal fertility. Two dummies are provided to control if the respondent has only a primary education level or an university level. At least two variables have to be considered to represent income: the female income and the male income. The dataset contains informations on the respondent's annual net income and on the total household income. Then income of male can easily be inferred 22 . Notice that an endogeneity bias can be suspected. Indeed, fertility and income can have common determinants which are not taken into account in the present paper. For example, one can expect that subsidies for day nurseries increase both fertility and incomes (higher labor force participation). This problem will be investigated during robustness checks. 
Results
The assumption that fertility is distributed following a Poisson distribution would result in the following probability of having y i = n children:
where i = exp (x i ) with x i the individual characteristics: However, individual fertility data often exhibit an excess of zero observations. So in order to take into account the high number of zero in the data set, a Zero In ‡ated Poisson (ZIP) regression model is proposed 23 . This method allows to explain both the number of children born (with a Poisson model) and the decision not to have children (with a Logit model).
The probability ( i ) for an individual to belong to the group exhibiting a zero count (G 0 )
is represented by a Logit model:
where z i are the variables explaining the decision to have children and i the estimated parameters. If an individual belongs to the zero group (G 0 = 1), her estimated fertility is always zero. If she does not belong to the zero group (G 0 = 0, with probability 1 i ), her fertility is assumed to be distributed following a Poisson distribution. Then, her probability to have n 0 children equals Pr [y i = n j x i ] = e i n i n! : Finally, the assumed distribution for count fertility is sensibly di¤erent from the Poisson regression model. Indeed, the overall probability for a zero count is:
And the probability for a positive count is: In order to clearly determine the impact of religion and cultural transmission, a step by step zero in ‡ated Poisson regression model is implemented (see Table 1 ). In a …rst In the present sample, the high number of zero counts is explained by the respondent's age, the size of her town and her "higher education status". The older a woman is, the lower her probability to have no child. Furthermore, a woman who has engaged in higher education and does not live in a small town has a smaller probability to choose not having children. Finally, the excess of zero re ‡ects both the strong postponement of …rst birth in developed economies (women tend to have their children after 28) and the fact that urban highly educated women more often choose not having children than other woman.
Alternative regressions for the excess of zero have been tested (see Table 3 in appendix).
I …nd that never having been married has no impact on the decision to not have children.
This result con…rms that limiting the study to married woman could bias the estimation of the impact of cultural background on fertility. Religiousness and to have only low education levels have no signi…cant impact on the probability to be childless.
As shown in Model 2, to have been raised in larger families signi…cantly increases the 24 Vuong statistics are reported in Table 1. respondent's fertility. Furthermore, the transmission of family oriented values among generations also increases fertility.
Another major result lies in the fact that having been raised in a religious family and proclaiming to be a religious believer do not signi…cantly increase expected fertility 26 (see Table 1 ). Indeed, in model 4 (Table 1) , the variable Believer was, a priori, signi…cant because, putting alone, it brings out two dimensions of the religious background: believing and practicing (religiousness). This is con…rmed when religiosity is added in the regressions (see model 5). Finally, religiousness measured by the frequency of o¢ ces attendance is the only religious variable which signi…cantly in ‡uences fertility.
Following these results, Model 6 indicates that an increase of one standard deviation in the O¢ ce Frequency increases the estimated fertility of the respondent by a factor of 1.044.
In other word, the estimated fertility of a woman with the maximal religiousness is 24%
higher than the expected fertility of a woman without any religiousness. It has to be noticed that the introduction of religious variables does not weaken the impact of proxies for the transmission of fertility patterns and family oriented values inside the family.
The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) indicates that Model 6 is very strongly preferred to Model 5. This con…rms that both having been raised in a speci…c religion and being a believer are meaningless to explain fertility behaviors. Following Raftery [1996] , the BIC indicates a positive evidence in favor of Model 6 against Model 1 but not a strong evidence.
As Model 1 and 6 are nested, a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test can be run. It appears that Model 6 should be strongly preferred to Model 1 27 .
Usual predictions of Family economics are also validated. Income of men and women have opposite e¤ects. The income of the woman has a negative impact on her fertility whereas the income of the man has a positive impact. This tends to con…rm that opportunity costs of fertility are essentially determined by the woman's income. This interpretation is conditional on the assumption that mothers have to invest a higher part of their time in child rearing.
In line with the results of Ahn & Mira [2002] , this e¤ect is expected to be smaller in France than in some other European countries like Germany, Greece and Italy. Indeed, the French infrastructures and …scal scheme allow women to conciliate a strong participation to the labor market and high fertility.
The impact of school attainment has a signi…cant impact on expected fertility only for less educated women. Indeed, the expected fertility of a woman who has only achieved primary education is 19,1% higher than a woman who has achieved a high school graduation. Women with an university level have a stronger probability not having children but, when they decide having children, their fertility behavior is not signi…cantly di¤erent from women who only have a high school diploma.
Finally, women younger than 28 exhibit a lower fertility than others. Indeed, in 2006, the average age of entry in fertility for French woman was 28. Furthermore, women older than 45 are expected to have achieved their reproduction process. In consequence, they mechanically tend to have more children than women who have not yet achieved their reproductive process. Notice that, as mentioned in the preceding section, this e¤ects are also suspected to derive from some cohort e¤ects 28 . However, the fact that the e¤ects of the position in the reproductive process are in adequacy with intuition, indicates that the cohort e¤ects are not too strong.
The following section provides some robustness checks. It checks that the signi…cant role of the cultural background in the Poisson regression model does not come neither from the assumptions on the distribution nor from the chosen measure of religiousness.
Robustness Checks
The following subsections test the robustness of my results with regard to assumptions on the distribution, endogeneity of the female income, the measure of religiousness and the sample selection.
Overdispersion and Alternative distributions
This subsection provides robustness checks for the distribution. The estimation of count data with a Poisson or Zero In ‡ated Poisson regression model can be subject to overdispersion. Looking at the summary values, it appears that the sample's variance (1,762) is greater than its mean (1, 582) . To test for overdispersion 29 , a zero in ‡ated Negative Binomial regression model is provided. The negative binomial regression model allows the variance of the distribution to be greater than its mean: V (y j x i ) = E(y j x i ): An LR test for the assumption = 0 is proposed. The probability of rejecting = 0 when this is true equals to 0,938. As the data set is not subjected to overdispersion, the zero in ‡ated Poisson regression model should be preferred 30 .
Fernandez & Fogli [2007] analyze fertility data at the micro level using ordered probit regressions. I also use this method to test the impact of cultural background on fertility in addition to Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regressions 31 . The ordered probit regression model (Table II) Expected di¤erential fertility between woman with the maximal religiousness and women without religiousness is about 20%.
In Table II These regressions con…rm that the signi…cance of the relation between religion, cultural transmission and fertility, is not dependent on my assumption on the distribution. 29 In case of overdispersion, the standard errors in the PRM will be biased downward, resulting in spuriously large z-values and spuriously small p-values (Cameron and Trivedi [1986] ). 30 Because = 0 with a very strong p-value, regressions are not reported. Indeed, values of estimated parameters are indentical in the two regressions. Their only di¤erences lie in the z-statistic for the in ‡ation term which are smaller in the zero in ‡ated negative binomial regression model than in the zero in ‡ated poisson regression model. Nevertheless, signi…cance of each variable remains unchanged. 31 underline that count data can sometimes be analyzed with OLS regression.
Endogeneity Bias and Instruments for Female Income
The Beckerian models of fertility show that fertility and income …nd common determinants like the cost of the quantity of children which determine both the female fertility and her participation to the labor market. If the female income is endogenous, it would be correlated with errors and result in some inconsistency. In this subsection, I propose to investigate this question in the framework of OLS models. As previously shown, OLS regressions provide satisfying results in comparison to zero in ‡ated poisson and probit models. Dealing with OLS allows to apply simple methods to address endogeneity.
I …rst perform a Durbin-Hausman-Wu test of endogeneity 32 for the female income which shows that the female income is endogenous. Indeed, the Durbin-Hausman-Wu statistics indicate that the probability to accept exogeneity of the female income while it is endogenous in reality, equals 37,6%. Following this result, I propose to instrument the women's income by the variables "Financial Expert" and "Bank Loan" 33 .
The variable "Financial Expert" comes from the answer to the following question: "When you have to make a …nancial investment, do you consult a Financial Expert?" Respondents has the choice between three answers: "Often", "Sometimes" or "Never" 34 . One can reasonably expect that the answer to this question is negative correlated with income because it is relied on the frequency and amounts of savings but not with fertility. Indeed, consulting …nancial expert tells nothing about the risk aversion of the respondent. So it is not suspected to be related to prudency or risk taking which could be, however, related to fertility.
The variable "Bank Loan" comes from the response to the following question: "If you needed money, do you expect that you could borrow it to a bank?" As for "Financial Expertise", the expectation about bank loan is suspected to be correlated with income but not with the fertility choice 35 . 32 This test simply was was …rst proposed by Durbin [1954] and separately by Wu [1973] and Hausman [1978] . 33 I choose to use two instruments rather than only one because it allows run Sargan and Di¤erence in Sargan tests for the exogeneity of instruments. Indeed, the Di¤erence in Sargan test (Hansen Sargan test) is a test of overidentifying restrictions (see Wooldridge [2000] ). 34 The variable "Financial Expert" equals to one if the respondent chooses "Often", to two if he chooses "Sometimes" and to three if "Never". Then "Financial Expert" is expected to negatively impact the income. 35 The variable "Bank Loan" equals one if the answer is "No" and zero if "Yes". Then "Bank Loan" is expected to be negatively correlated to the respondent's income. Table 4 in appendix. As expected, the variables "Financial Expertise" and "Bank Loan" both have a negative and signi…cant impact on income (see "female income regression" in Table 4 ). Furthermore, after its instrumentation, female income still has a signi…cant negative impact on expected fertility while male income has a positive one. Notice that coe¢ cients of "Primary Education" and "Parental Fertility" and "O¢ ce Frequency" still have the same sign but are now smaller. Furthermore "O¢ ce Frequency" is now signi…cant at the 5% con…dence level and "Primary Education" and "Parental Fertility" at the 10% one. I provide Sargan and Di¤erence in Sargan statistics to test the exogeneity of my instruments. These tests conclude that these latters are satisfying at the 5% con…dence level (see Table 4 ).
Regressions are provided in
Finally, in the OLS framework, there exist an endogeneity bias for female income. After a correction for this bias, the e¤ects I determined in the precedent section remain robust 36 .
An alternative Measure of Religiousness
The data set provides an alternative measure of the respondent's religiousness. It consists in the answer to the question "Between 0 and 10, how do you evaluate the importance of religion in your own life?". This variable is subject to some caveats. Indeed, it consists in a subjective variable while the frequency of church attendance is an objective criterion.
Two respondents can have the same religious behavior but di¤erent subjective estimates of the importance of religion. An absolute notation makes interpretations harder because di¤erences in evaluations are less objective than di¤erences in church attendance. To weaken this limitation, a variable "Estimated Religiousness" is constructed. It equals: (i) 1 if the respondent's answer belongs to [0,3], (ii) 2 if his answer belongs to [4, 6] and (iii) 3 if it belongs to [7, 10] .
The variable "O¢ ce Frequency" has been replaced by the variable "Estimated Religiousness" in the zero in ‡ated Poisson regression model and in the ordered probit regression model (see Table 5 in appendix). In the zero in ‡ated Poisson regression model, "Estimated Religiousness" has a signi…cant positive impact on fertility when the variables "No Religion" and "Believer" are not taken into account. An LR test between the model with "Estimated Religiousness" and without it, indicates that the …rst model is preferred at the 5 percent level. The di¤erences in BIC are not conclusive. The expected di¤erential fertility between an agent who strongly care about religion (Estimated Religiousness = 3) and an agent who does not care about religion (Estimated Religiousness = 1) equals to 10,2%. The same kind of results are found with the ordered probit regressions where BIC di¤erences indicates a strong preferences for the model which includes religiousness. Notice that, once again, the impact of the transmission of values into the family, is robust to the introduction of religious variables.
It appears that studying the impact of religion with the variable "Strong Religiosity" is less conclusive than with the Church attendance. This is probably due to the inherent imperfections of this measure. However, whatever the chosen measure and the estimation strategy, exhibiting a strong religiousness always increases fertility, at least at the 5 percent level of con…dence.
Alternative Samples
As mentioned in section 4, all women of the sample have not yet achieved their reproductive process at the moment of the study. This could imply some doubts about what is really measured. Indeed, the fertility of a woman older than 45 years old can be considered as a completed fertility while the fertility of a younger woman can be considered as a current fertility. Model 2 of the preceding section was run on the subsample of women who achieved their reproductive process 37 . Intuitively, the distribution is less suspected to exhibit an excess of zero observations since this was greatly explained by the age of the respondent.
Indeed, the Vuong test indicates that the Poisson regression model is preferred to the zero in ‡ated Poisson regression model 38 . An ordered Probit regression model is also provided (see Table 6 in appendix).
In both models, strong religiousness still increases the expected fertility of the respondent.
For example, as in the preceding section, the fertility di¤erential between strong practicers (O¢ ce Frequency = 6) and agents who do not practice at all, is about 16%.
As mentioned in the discussion about the strategy of estimation, the e¤ect of age is di¢ cult to interpret when it is directly added in the regression. Nevertheless, a zero in ‡ated regression model where the age of the respondent directly enters the determinants of the non zero counts in place of the age dummies, was run (see Table 7 ). The impact of age on expected fertility is obviously positive and signi…cant. However, the impact of religiousness is smaller than for the entire sample and is signi…cant only at the 5% con…dence level. The impact of female's education is no more signi…cant. This result seems to con…rm that directly adding the age variable in the regression captures important e¤ects that are independent from the simple position of the woman in her process of fertility. Indeed, it seems to capture, at least, the recent evolution of school enrollment. Despite this limitation, the e¤ect of religiousness is also validated.
Finally, as in Brae nas-Garza & Neuman [2006], the zero in ‡ated Poisson regression model
is also provided for the entire sample including men and women ( Table 6 ). A dummy "Female" is introduced, it has a positive and signi…cant impact on fertility. On the whole population, the variable "O¢ ce Frequency" is strongly signi…cant but exhibits a smaller value than for the women's subsample: maximal di¤erential fertility between strong religiousness and no religiousness equals 18,2%.
Conclusion
Studies of the French fertility at the micro level have always been truncated of their religious dimension. Indeed, the French law makes it very di¢ cult to collect individual data on religious a¢ liation. The data set "Enquête Mode de Vie des Francais" allows, for the …rst time, to analyze the impact of religion on fertility in France. Furthermore, it provides complementary proxies for cultural transmission into the family: the fertility of the respondent's parent and the transmission of "Family Oriented Values". It appears that having been raised in a religious family has no signi…cant e¤ect on fertility and considering oneself as a believer does not matter either. Religiousness, whatever the measure chosen, has always a positive and signi…cant impact on expected fertility. A woman who has a strong religiousness has an 24 percent higher expected fertility than a woman without religiousness at all.
The present paper also validates usual predictions of family economics. The income of 20 men has a positive impact on woman's fertility while the women's own income has a negative impact on her fertility. Moreover, the women's school attainment has a negative impact on their expected number of children.
Because the sample su¤ers from an under representation of Muslims, Jews and Protestants, the religious a¢ liation could not be properly investigate. Moreover, the ethnic origin of the respondent is not available in the data set. Future works should aim at building a speci…c data set dedicated to the study of fertility behaviors in France where religious and ethnic informations would be collected. This would allow to make more precise measurement of fertility behaviors and of the impact of culture on it, culture encompassing a richer set of dimensions. (3.42)*** Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1% 
